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Images, networked affect and social change 
 
Carolyn Pedwell, SSPSSR, University of Kent  
 
While many people remain hopeful that particular images of injustice will have 
the power to catalyse progressive transformation, there is also widespread belief 
in the inevitability of ǮǯǤBringing philosophers of habit into 
conversation with contemporary scholars of affect, visual culture and digital 
media, this article argues for a more nuanced understanding of the links between 
images and change Ȃ one in which political feeling and political action are 
complexly intertwined and repeated sensation does not necessarily lead to 
disaffection.  Ǯǯ compelling us to inhabit 
our sensorial responses to images, I suggest, we may become better attuned to 
everyday patterns of seeing, feeling, thinking and interacting Ȃ and hence to the 
possibility of change at the level of habit.  This article thus contends that thinking 
affect and habit together as imbricated may enable us to better understand the 
dynamics of both individual and socio-political change today.   
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 Ǯǯlongstanding critical 
analysis of the politics of representation, many of us living in relative comfort in 
the Global North retain a persistent (if fraught) investment in the power of 
exceptional images to catalyse progressive social change.  When we find 
ourselves moved by a particularly disturbing or revelatory image, we often 
assume that other people will be too - we hope that the image (and what it 
reveals about wider socio-political conditions, inequalities and forms of 
violence) will affectively ignite people, jolting them out of complacency and 
towards action that may ultimately work to engender greater social justice.   
In 2015, in the midst of the ongoing European refugee crisis, it was the 
heartbreaking photograph of Alan Kurdi, the three-year-old Syrian refugee 
whose small body washed up on the shores of Bodrum, Turkey, that awakened 
with powerful force such affective hopes and responses.  Global media outlets 
had, for months, been covering the harrowing attempts of Syrians (among 
millions of other refugees internationally) to leave their country, as well as the 
horrific suffering faced by many of those who remained.  Yet it was this shocking 
photograph, printed across the front pages of hundreds of newspapers 
worldwide on 1st September 2015 and shared exponentially on social media in 
the days and weeks that followed, that elicited an unprecedented transnational 
outpouring of outrage, sadness, grief and compassion, inciting widespread 
demands for political action and change.    
 
As Robert Fisk, the Independentǯsuggests, the 
force of public response to this particular image, taken by Nilüfer Demir for the 
Turkish agency DHA, was not unrelated to the fact that Alan Ǯ
little European boy, and [was] white rather than brown-ǯ.  Indeed, what 
was masked by the emotional torrent ǯ image elicited was the 
fact that he was just one of tens of Ǯwhose remains lie today on the sea 
bed of the Mediterranean, forever unrecorded and unfilmǯȋ	ǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ online).  
Nonetheless, the photograph traveled far and wide transforming and amplifying 
its affective impact as it became the subject of myriad tweets, comment-pieces, 
digital memes, campaigns and art interventions.  Researchers at the University of 
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Sheffield estimated that 53,000 tweets per hour were sent at the height of the ǯ ? ?
course of 12 days (Ratnam, 2016: online).  In the months that followed, graffiti 
artists Oºuz fen and Justus Becker created a giant mural of Kurdi on the bank of 
river Main in Frankfurt, Germany, Ǯas both a memorial and a call to ǯ (Bowden, 2016: online).  Moreover, in a particularly high-profile and 
controversial piece, the Chinese artist and activist Ai WeiWei recreated the 
photograph of Kurdi by lying face-down on a beach on the Greek island of Lesbos 
as part of a series of projects designed to draw attention to the growing scale and 
human toll of the international refugee crises (Tan, 2016: online).  This image 
had, as Fisk notes, Ǯǲǳǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣȌǤ  
 
Two days after Kurdiǯ death, Germany agreed to admit thousands of refugees 
previously stranded in Hungary, which encouraged political leaders in central 
and eastern Europe to establish a humanitarian corridor stretching from 
northern Greece to southern Bavaria while Canada committed to resettling 
25,000 Syrians.  Although in the UK David Cameron agreed to accept only 4,000 
refugees a year until 2020, this was far more than he had previously been willing 
to offer (Kingsley, 2016: online).  In the longer term, the audience intelligence 
firm Pulsar claims, based on analysis of digital analytics, ǯ 
global circulation may have been responsible for a wide-scale public uptake of ǮǯȋǮǯȌǡǮa significant shift of ǯȋǯǡ
2016: online).  Yet, by mid-2016 European leaders had abandoned their earlier 
humanitarian approach, as right-wing populisms rose across Europe and North ǡǮǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣȌǤ  A year after the release of Kurdiǯ image, 
the number of refugees who had died at sea had increased by more than a fifth ȋǯǡ ? ? ? ?ǣȌ
Migration indicated that refugee fatalities would pass the landmark figure of 
10,000 in 2016 (Townsend and McVeigh, 2016: online).  In this context, Fiske 
worries that little of significance has changed with respect to how we treat 
refugees internationally and that the image of Alan Kurdi Ǯobscured a host of 
ǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǣ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lessons which we ignored Ȃ and continue to disregard Ȃ  ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ
online).  
 
This example, and the hopes we pin on arresting or revelatory images more 
generally, are linked to wider investments in affect, emotion and feeling as 
vehicles for progressive social change.  In the context of Ǯǯ, we 
have increasingly focused on Ǯǯmight lead to meaningful self 
and social transformation.  Whether via the shock of unwilled empathy, the 
burning sensation of accumulated indignation or the disorientation of undefined 
affective intensity, the promise of affect is that it will engender forms of knowing Ǯǯȋtky, 1996: 179).  Through being made to 
feel deep empathy, for example, the hope is that subjects will never be the same 
again; their views of the world will be radically transformed, as will their 
behaviors and actions, in the interests of greater social justice (Pedwell, 2014, 
2016).  Or, in a more Deleuzian vein, the wager is that a direct connection with 
sensation may engȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǯǣǮthrust us ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ȌǤ Such narratives Ǯǯ are often inspiring and compelling.  My point, however, is 
that they usually do not focus on what happens after the event of being moved.  
Feelings are often fluid, fleeting and hard to control.  Indeed, this is one key way 
in which affect has been understood in critical scholarship: as linked to 
sensations which are temporary or ephemeral.  And yet, when affective 
responses are sustained or repeated over time they may lose their radical edge, 
as we find ourselves compulsively engaging in potentially stultifying practices of Ǯǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ What is it, then, that enables meaningful 
cognitive, psychic and embodied change catalysed (or signaled) by affect to take 
shape and endure rather than simply peak and collapse or become quickly re-
aǮǯǫǡ
understand the materialisation of affect in this context?   
 Ǯǯ
processes, relations and experiences Ȃ ranging from individual expressions of 
ǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǣ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Subjectivity (in press).  
 5 
feeling to the production of sensation within human-technology assemblages.  It 
is important to acknowledge that the diverse scholars I cite in my discussion do 
not share a common or coherent approach to affect.  ThǮǯ
broadly has been animated by ongoing debates regarding how best to define, and ǡǮǯǡǮǯǮǯǤi  My view is 
that it is sometimes useful to make contingent analytical distinctions between 
these concepts, without suggesting that they are wholly discrete or that they Ǯǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ȌǤIf, for instance, we 
are referring to emerging and shifting intensities rather than named discursive 
entiǡǮǯǮǯǤn employing a 
purposefully broad concept of affect here, however, I seek to acknowledge how 
embodied sensations and psychic and cognitive experiences are constitutively 
intertwined in complex ways (Ahmed, 2004) Ȃ while also recognising that 
processes of affecting and being affected always exceed the boundaries of human 
subjectivity and consciousness (Clough, 2007; Blackman, 2012).  Indeed, affect is, 
in my view, an inherently relational term Ȃ it signifies emergent interactions of 
human and non- or more-than human actors which are productive of different 
kinds of sensation and becoming (Pedwell, 2014; Ash, 2015).  As such, affect is 
not a thing, or a property, but rather a form of sensorial relationality - as well as 
an interpretive approach and critical field of study.  
 
Elsewhere, I have argued that paying closer attention to habit may help us to ǡǮǯ
change Ȃ and, more specifically, to gain a richer understanding of how, and under 
what conditions, affective transformation is materialised (Pedwell, 2016).  Over 
the past decade, an emergent critical return to the notions of habit and 
habituation has been gaining momentum across a range of fields, with scholars 
engaging the work of American pragmatism, continental philosophy, classical 
sociological theory, phenomenology, psychoanalysis and neuroscience, among 
other fields, to rethink the contemporary workings of social life Ȃ from the 
unconscious habits of white privilege (Sullivan, 2005, 2015), to the patterned 
dynamics of biopolitical governance (Bennett et al, 2013, Bennett, 2015; 
Blackman, 2013), to the digital routines and possibilities of algorithmic life 
ǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǣ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(Chung, 2016).ii  Habit is a particularly fruitful concept within discussions of 
social change, I want suggest, because of its double nature: it attunes us 
simultaneously to the powerful automated processes and mechanisms 
underlying the tendency for patterns of oppression and inequality to persist and 
the necessary, yet counterintuitive, role of habituation in enabling meaningful 
and enduring forms of socio-political transformation.iii  Indeed, while the 
automatic force of habit can compel us to repeat previous modes of action again 
and again, it is nonetheless only through material processes of habituation that 
new tendencies may be created which are deeply rooted and robust enough to 
endure.  Habit formation and modification, then, are vital to individual and social 
transformation Ȃ affect may offer the spark that catalyses embodied 
transformation, yet without some form of habituation, enduring change may fail 
to take shape.   
 
In bringing literatures and debates about affect and habit together, this article 
thus seeks to complicate influential frameworks that would figure their logics, 
temporalities and implications as unrelated or discrete.  In doing so, I draw on 
and extend earlier vital scholarship in affect and emotion studies.iv  In her Ǯǯǡample, Margaret Wetherell explores how 
affect is inextricably Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ȌǤǡ
she argues, is not only or primarily Ǯǡ-
offǯ activities; rather, it takes shape largely through longer-term processes of 
emotional regulation and the sedimentation of affective patterns.  As such, Ǯǯȋ ? ?ȌǤǡǯǡ
affective patterns also offer potential Ȃ that is, the possibility for embodied 
relations and Ǯǯȋ ?ȌǤǡ
examines how, through its role in affect modulation, habit assumes a paradoxical 
position: it plays a roǮȋȌǯǡǮǯǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?ȌǤ
her genealogical analysis of some of the founding concepts and debates in social 
psychology, Blackman seeks to complicate contemporary associations of both 
habit and affect with non-intentionality and (an overly mechanical view of) 
ǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǣǡ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automatism Ȃ highlighting the ways in which affect-habit interactions can Ǯǡǯȋ ? ? ?; 
see also Blackman, 2012; Grosz, 2013).  In this vein, my discussion aims to 
illustrate that processes of affecting and being affected and of habituation and re-
habituation interact with one another in complex ways and it is this interaction 
that is significant to the workings of individual and collective transformation.  
 
In order to flesh out these arguments, I explore the particular relations among 
affect, habit, visual images and media technologies.  My rationale for this focus is 
twofold: firstly, visual culture plays a key role in the mediation of embodied 
habits of perception, feeling and conduct, and secondly, as I have suggested, 
images have long been central to how the logics and possibilities of social 
transformation have been understood.  In the first section, I outline how 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century European and American philosophers, 
such as Felix Ravaisson, William James and John Dewey understood the 
significance of habituation and re-habituation to social life, focusing on their 
analyses of the links between habit, affect and change.  Here I pay particular ȋȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǯǣ
tendency for repeated action to gain strength and precision over time and for 
repeated feeling, by contrast, to wither and become passive.  Drawing on Susan ǯǡRegarding the Pain of Others (2003), the second section 
discusses how the power of shocking images to catalyse meaningful 
transformation has been understood as tempered by the phenomenon of 
affective habituation Ȃ ǡǡǯǡǮǯǤ 
 
The third section turns to the realm of digital media to consider how debates 
about visual culture and the promise of change have played out within ever-
shifting virtual networks in which images are always connected to other images.  
While some scholars view digital image-based technologies as offering 
transformative opportunities for Ǯǡǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?Ǣ
Rentschler and Thrift, 2015a, b), others perceive the affective intensities of 
ǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǣǡ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ǯǡ
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online visual culture as antithetical to meaningful socio-political change.  In the 
realm of social media, these latter theorists suggest, our habitual search for Ǯǯ
capitalism Ȃ a process that continuously replaces political action with political 
feeling, forever turning activity into passivity (Dean, 2015; Paasonen, 2015).  In ǡǡǯ-
think this opposition of political feeling and political action, and the concomitant 
equation of repeated affect with de-sensitisation and passivity.  As I discuss, the 
fact that sensing can be turned into an activity indicates how habituated affect Ǯǯȋǡ
2014: 82).  Linking back to my primary concern regarding the relationships 
between visual images and social transformation, I suggest that while our 
affective responses to images can produce a powerful spark that moves us (at 
least temporarily), affect can also Ǯǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
that protracts our relationship with an image (or visual environment), 
compelling us to inhabit the sensorial intensity of our encounter and its critical 
implications.  When this happens, feeling can be made active in a way that 
engages the possibility of transformation at the level of habit Ȃ alerting us to the 
blips and gaps in habitual perception and conduct Ǯǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
 ǯgument, then, is that understanding the role of visual 
images and media technologies in processes of social change requires a 
perspective that thinks affect and habit, feeling and action, passivity and activity 
together as imbricated within the non-linear temporalities of material life.  
In this view, political feeling and political action are not as distinct as they may 
appear; rather, they are intimately intertwined.  Moreover, sensation is not 
inevitably short-lived and affective habituation is not always de-sensitising or 
reproductive of the status quo.  Yet, as I suggest in the last section, this critical 
endeavor also requires that we re-ǮǯǤl culture 
underscores most suggestively is how meaningful forms of socio-political ȋȌǮǯǡ
ǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǣǡ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rather (or also) through the accumulation and reverberation of seemingly minor 
affective responses, interactions, gestures and habits.  
  
Habit, affect and social change  
 
Engagement with habit has a long history in philosophy and social theory Ȃ from ǯǮǯ
moral acts, to Imǯǡǯ-
economic class and habitus.v  In the tradition of Descartes and Kant, habituation 
has widely been associated with forms of mindless repetition that keep us tied to 
the status quo.vi  Nineteenth and early twentieth-century philosophers such as 
Felix Ravaisson, William James, and John Dewey, however, explored how habit 
formation and modification are central to the workings of individual and social ǮǯǤ	ǡǡ
was trained as a medical doctor and psychologist, habitvii is key to material Ǯǯal ǤǡǡǮǡǯ
([1914]2004: 5).  In other words, the material malleability of human (and other) 
bodies Ȃ their capacity to be made and re-made through habituation Ȃ is central 
to the possibility of engaging enduring forms of change over time.  
 
Similarly, for the French philosopher and archaeologist Ravaisson, habit is the 
essence of being and becoming Ȃ that is, processes of habituation are central to   Ǯpower of moving or of acting into a tendency to move or ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?, original italics).  Pre-
figuring the more recent interventions of philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze 
and Henri Bergson in his book Of Habit ([1888]2008), Ravaisson describes 
habituation as involving a repetition, but a repetition that produces a difference, ǡǮǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣȌǤviii  As the philosopher 
Catherine Malabou puts it, in transforming a potentiality into a tendency through ǡǮa being was able to 
ǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǣǡǯǡ
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change once, in the manner of contracting a habit, it can change again.  It is ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣȌǤ	ǡǮ
power are found in and through the constitution of habits, not through their ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ȌǤcreation of habits, rather 
than their cessation, that more progressive and enduring forms social 
transformation might be activated. 
 
Although not their specific focus, these thinkers each had thought-provoking 
things to say about the relationship between affect, habit and social 
transformation.  For Dewey, an American pragmatist philosopher and 
educational reformer, the problem with modes of social reform that depend 
predominantly on the production of certain feelings (i.e. the generation of 
empathy, compassion or moral indignation) is that they tend to remove thought 
from embodied action and the individual from their environment.  That is, he 
contends in Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology 
([1922]2012), such strategies assume that exposure to new affective knowledge ǮǯǮǯǡ
attending to the imbricated embodied and environmental factors that work 
powerfully to support and perpetuate existing patterns of behavior.  Dewey 
offers a useful analogy hereǣǮ
standing improperly, a positive, forceful habit [...] conditions have been formed 
for producing a bad result, and the bad result will occur as long as those ǯȋ ? ?ȌǤch to individual or social change, 
then, needs to account for those material processes that underlie everyday 
actions or tendencies.  Moreover, given that many of the mechanisms that enable 
and perpetuate behavior operate below the level of consciousness - and indeed, 
most habitual gestures are powerful precisely because they have become 
automatic at an unconscious level - methods of transformative intervention that 
appeal exclusively rational thought or critical reflexivity often miss the mark. 
 
More broadly, Dewey acknowledges the potential of feeling to spark cognitive 
and embodied transformation, yet he is suspicious of the capacity for such ǣǮǤ
ǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǣǡ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ǯȋ[1922]2012: 101).  Ravaisson similarly addresses Ǯǯsensation, once repeated or sustained, dulls and loses force 
whereas repeated or sustained action gains in strength and momentum.  As he 
puts it: 
 
The continuity or the repetition of passion weakens it; the continuity or 
repetition of action exalts and strengthens it. Prolonged or repeated 
sensation diminishes gradually and eventually fades away. Prolonged or 
repeated movement becomes gradually easier, quicker and more assured 
([1838]2008: 49).  
 ǯǣ
feelings that routinely fail to be translated into action, he suggests, frequently 
leads ǣǮ
personages of the play, while her coachman is freezing to death on his seat ǯ
([1914]2004: 63).  Although I ǮǯǮǯǡhlight the limits 
of models of progressive social change premised exclusively on affective rupture 
or revolution.   
 
While affect may act as a trigger that drives forward embodied and material 
change, or signals when existing habits have become disrupted, it cannot 
participate in enduring processes of transformation without some degree of 
habituation or automation.  Yet, the risk is that when particular affective 
responses become routine, they can lose their force and may actually prevent 
meaningful action and change.  What is required, therefore, is a mode of critical 
intervention that addresses the complex interaction of affect and habit within 
ongoing material processes of transformation (Blackman, 2012, 2013; Wetherell, 
2012; Grosz, 2013).  Keeping these philosophical ideas in mind, the next sections 
consider how social and cultural theorists have understood some of the ways in 
ǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǣ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which visual Ǯǯȋ
not), and the embodied and ethical implications of such processes.    
 
Images and the power of being moved 
 
Susan Sontag memorably opens Regarding the Pain of Others (2003), her 
poignant mediation on human suffering and the meanings and uses of images, 
with a discussion of Virginia Woǯemerging 
from the Spanish civil war in the late 1930s.  Released by the Spanish 
government twice a week, these were the first ǯ
victims to be published in international newspapers - and therefore wholly 
shocking to many, including Woolf, who offers a disturbing description of their 
content in Three Guineas (1938): 
 ǯs the photograph of what might be a ǯǡǯǢǡ
hand, be the body of a pig.  But those certainly are dead children, and that 
undoubtedly is the section of a house.  A bomb has torn open the side; 
there is still a bird-cage hanging in what was presumably the sitting ǥȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
 	ǯǡǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ?ȌǤ were so arresting, 
so appalling, that, having seen them, Woolf implored, British people, and ǮǯǡǤǡǡǡǮ
pictures, not to recoil from them, not to strive to abolish what causes this havoc, ǥǯȋ ?ȌǤǯǡǡǯ
the power of shocking images to move us towards progressive social and 
political change.  
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We could draw parallels between these photographs and other harrowing 
representations: shocking images of the human carnage of the Vietnam war, the 
starvation of Ethiopian children, the torture and humiliation of prisoners in Abu 
Ghraib, the human and environmental devastation of Hurricane Katrina, and, 
most recently, the relentless bombing of Aleppo, Syria.  While emerging from 
very different geo-political contexts and circumstances, images connected with 
each of these examples have been invested by various commentators and publics 
with the power to radically affect; to wrench us away from the status quo and 
propel us towards socio-ǤǡǮǲǳ (or ǲǳȌǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ?Ȍǡǡǡ
not help but move people towards a recognition of the suffering of others (and 
their own potential complicity in it), and hence towards organising for change.ix  
Of course, all of such images did (and do) affect different people in many 
important ways.  However, as the history of critical engagement with the politics 
and possibilities of representation has illustrated, the reality of what images do is 
much more complicated and less predictable than our enduring investment in 
their powers conveys.  
 
Much has been written about the complexity of our affective responses to visual 
representations.  Photographs of violence or injustice, scholars suggest, can 
produce a wide array of reactions among different viewers in different contexts, 
from empathy and compassion, to horror and fear, to indifference and irritation, 
and even perverse pleasure or enjoyment (Sontag, 2003; Carby, 2004; 
Chouliaraki, 2006).  Furthermore, even if particular images of suffering do elicit 
empathetic or compassionate responses, there is no guarantee that the 
implications of such affective reactions will be progressive.  As Lauren Berlant ǡǮcompassion carries the weight of ongoing debates about the ethics of ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ?ȌǤ
concerning whether or not to extend compassion or empathy to less privileged ǮǯȋȌ
geo-political boundaries and hierarchies (Pedwell, 2014).  The question of who Ǯǲǳ-ǯ
ǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǣ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crucial (Sontag, 2003: 6).  Scholars have also paid careful attention to the 
political uses and misuses of images Ȃ how images are selected, framed and 
combined with other media by various governmental, media, corporate and 
other political actors to modulate affect in particular ways, with a range of 
ideological and ethical consequences (Hall, 1997; Mirzoeff, 2006; Zeilezer, 2010).  
As much of this work has illustrated, affecting images function just as often to 
preserve the status quo as they do to ignite affirmative change.  
 
My specific concerns here, however, are somewhat different: Even if we accept, 
for a moment, that particular affective reactions to visual representations may be 
conducive to catalysǮǯǡ
how it is that we understand the workings of such material and socio-political 
process? How do images move us (or not) and how does this resultant sensation 
drive forward wider forms of personal or social transformation?  In other words, 
how can we understand the relations among images, affect, habit and change? As ǡǮǯȋȌ
the role of images in material processes of affective, perceptual and behavioral 
habituation and re-habituation.    
 ǯThree Guineas suggests, our investment in the capacity 
of images to ignite change is linked to expectations of what will happen when Ǯǯ to people, when we become aware in visceral 
clarity of horrifying or tragic situations of which we may have previously been 
ignorant.  In Regarding the Pain of Others, however, Sontag was concerned that 
the relentless onslaught of mediated images of death and disaster had produced ǣǮǯǡǡǮ
remember only ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ȌǤǡ Ǯǯ
(19).  Rather than forcing more privileged groups to confront the reality of ǯǡ
distance people from ǮǯǮǯ- to make us feel as if 
ǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮ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representation or simulation are all there is.  Furthermore, in a culture of ǮǯǮǯǡ
Sontag suggests we risk becoming habituated to the stream of ever more 
dramatic or disturbing photos (20).x  From this perspective, instead of producing Ǯǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǮawareness, ǡǯ
(Sontag, 2003: 11).  
 
While not all images inevitably lose their ability to shock, to enrage or to elicit 
compassion, Sontag argues, the point is that such affective responses, on their 
own, are not equal to substantive change.  Echoing the philosophers of habit ǡǮǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǮǯǮǯǮǯȋ ? ?ȌǤ
Ravaisson in his double law of habit ([1838]2008), her comments imply a theory 
of habituation in which affective responses tend to lose their force through 
repetition, whereas repeated actions continuously gain in power and efficacy.  
While images of pain may continue to produce compassion, Sontag argues, 
repeated compassionate responses can become no more than an affective script, 
an emotional short-ǯ in familiar ways but does ǯ
engagement.xi  ǡǯȋȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
gap between ethical feelings and ethical actions, Sontag suggests that ultimately 
it is action that matters Ȃ without meaningful action, feeling flounders.  Indeed, Ǯǡǯ
(Sontag, 2003: 12), it was only one year after the publication of Three Guineas 
Ǥǯ
horrific human toll do move us, and the affect they ignite can be potent, none of 
this was enough, Sontag suggests, to disable the industrial war machine, to 
uproot or redirect the automated habits of violence and destruction central to 
world systems in the twentieth century and beyond.  
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 ǯ
culture and is indicative of a prominent strand of work on images, sensation and 
habit that persists today, despite notable transformations in media cultures and 
technologies.  Yet, for Sontag, it would seem, habituation is framed solely in the 
negative: Haǯǡ
what might make action more graceful and precise or what might enable change 
to become rooted enough to endure.  As such, we might say that Regarding the 
Pain of Others tells only half ǯȂ an elision with significant 
implications for how we understand the links between images and social change.  
Writing at the beginning of the new millennium, Sontag was also not yet in a 
position to confront what the rise of social media would mean for the affective 
workings of images Ȃ their networked nature and their rapid circulation and 
reconfiguration online.  Consequently, her analysis cannot fully confront the 
ways in which visual digital media become folded into our embodied habits and 
modes of perception Ȃ ǡǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ?ȌǤ
complexities will be addressed in the following sections through attending to 
more recent scholarship on digital media, visual culture and affect.  
 
Affective mediation and networked affect  
 
If, in the late 1930s, Woolf was confronted with harrowing photographs from the 
Spanish civil war in her morning newspaper a few times a week and found 
herself in the frustrating position of spectator, we now conduct our lives in and 
through an endless stream of mediated images and have the ability to produce, 
remediate and distribute them online through a host of digital technologies and 
applications.  From the perspective of some scholars, such techno-cultural 
developments have enabled new and distinctive forms of affective mediation 
with potentially significant material and socio-political implications.  In their 
introduction to the collection Networked Affect, for example, Ken Hillis, Susanna Ǯ
ǡȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǣǡ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mobilizǯǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ?ȌǤǡtshler and 
Samantha Thrift explore, in their introduction to a special issue of Feminist 
Theory ǡǮǯ
(2015a: 240).  Though the use of visual memes, they argue, activists employ 
humor and other Ǯǡǥǯ(240).  Central to such 
claims is not only the observation that digital technologies connect people across 
social and geographical boundaries in ways that can enhance political 
consciousness-raising and organising, but also that the technological capacities 
of online visual media may have the power to move us in novel and salient ways.  
 
The promise of such technological capacities is brought to life by James Ash in 
his contribution to Networked Affect, which offers a cogent analysis of the 
affective workings of Graphic Interchange Format files (GIFs).  A GIF can ǮǯǡǡǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?ȌǤ
was concerned that our ubiquitous exposure to disturbing images could 
desensitise us to their affective power (as well as their wider meanings and Ȍǡ
	ǮǯǤǡt is precisely because of their repetitive and automated 
qualities 
	Ǯǯȋ ? ? ?Ȍǣ 
 
In the same way that repeatedly speaking a word causes it to sound 
strange and foreign, because it is uttered outside the context of familiar 
use, constantly looping GIF images alter the images into new rhythms of 
sensation.  The reorganization of movement and color, and the 
introduction of repetition, give the GIF a different capacity to affect 
compared to its source material (129). 
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Ash thus understands our relationship with GIFs as primarily affective in nature; 
images modulated in this format can move us in highly embodied ways: Their ǮǯǡǡǮǯǮǯǡǮǡǯȋ ? ? ?ȌǤǯǡ
	
intensified power to affect Ȃ to reach into bodies and move us (literally) at a 
material level that is effective because, following Dewey ([1922]2012), it is 
working largely below realm of active consciousness at the incremental level of 
embodied sensation, reflex and habit. 
 
Importantly, however, for Ash, Hillis et al and others working in the Deleuzian 
tradition, affect cannot be understood as a human experience alone; rather, it is Ǯ
human, technical and non-ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?; see also Ash, 2012).  
In figuring our affective interaction with digital images as produced through Ǯǡǯ (Hillis et al, 2015: 10), these analyses resonate with Ǯǯȋ	ǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǮǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
this emerging body of analysis are the imperatives, firstly, to address current 
media landscapes and their implications through a focus on complex networks or 
assemblages (rather than figuring particular media forms or technologies in 
isolation), and secondly, to understand mediation as a process that is neither 
bounded or linear, but rather, ontological and relational - and one with ongoing 
embodied and material implications.  While writing nearly a century earlier, ǯ
gestures, affects and hǮǯȋȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ȌǤǡ
suggests, work by adapting to a given environment (and taking aspects of it in), 
but they also function to affect and reconfigure environments Ȃ and because ǮǯǡǮǯȋ ? ?ȌǤxii For our 
current purposes, what emerges clearly from these various perspectives, as 
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ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡ bodies 
and images are not separate; rather bodies become through images (a relational 
and ongoing process of mediation), and images are always connected to other 
images.  
 
In approaching networked affect, then, we are, of course, never addressing the 
potential effects of one image, one GIF or one video in isolation, but rather, the 
affective relations among multiple, changing digital files and configurations. 
Rentschler and Thrift (2015b) reflect on the implications of such dynamics in 
their analysis of feminist digital memes.  Focusing on the evolving network of 
satiric responses that erupted online following Republican presidential nominee ǯǮǯ ? ? ? ?xiii, they suggest that the 
affective power and political efficacy of visual memes is enabled by the linked 
dynamics of amplification and participation.  Memes are, by their very nature, 
propagative: it is in making some small, yet notable, modification to a previous 
visual contribution that each new contribution keeps the meme alive while 
simultaneously engendering politically salient humour.  For instance, in the ǯǡ
of a Tumbler, a Facebook Page and mock customer reviews for three-ring 
binders sold on Amazon.com emerged online.  Image-macros bearing photos of ǮǫǨǯ
rapidly across these sites, alongside a host of other contributions, from a picture 
of Patrick Swayze with the caption ǮǯǮǯȋ
Thrift, 2015b).  Such digital resonances and reverberations among images, 
digital platforms and users, Rentschler and Thrift argue, work to amplify affect - 
in this case laughter that highlights the inadequacy of Republican responses to 
gender inequality in income and political governance.xiv  Furthermore, as I will 
discuss later on, the creative and participatory elements of memes move a range 
of digital subjects beyond the position of spectator by engaging them in the 
political artǮǯ Ǯǯ.  Enabled, in part, by the technological 
capacities of social media, the dynamics of political memes could thus be seen 
(similar to ǯ
	Ȍ to work against the passive affective 
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habituation which Sontag described as negating meaningful personal or social 
transformation.  
 
Despite their focus on the links between images, affect and social change, what 
such vital contributions do not really address, however, are the material logics 
and mechanisms by which the Ǯǯǡ Ǯǯ or Ǯǯ forms of affect 
produced within contemporary digital networks might be translated (or not) 
into more enduring capacities or forms of social transformation.  In other words, 
at a material level, what does being repeatedly stimulated, moved or affected via 
images, GIFs or memes do and why does it matter?  What kinds of wider 
embodied and socio-political changes might such everyday forms of affective 
mediation engender?  More specifically, while Rentshler and Thrift argue that the 
propagative and participatory nature of memes increases their affective 
purchase, can this amplification lead to the development of new collective 
routines or tendencies - or do Ǯflamesǯ rise high only to quickly fizzle out 
(Paasonen, 2015), leaving little meaningful material or political trace?  These 
questions seem important given the earlier warnings of thinkers such as 
Ravaisson, James and Dewey that enduring forms of personal or collective 
change are not likely to emerge through the charge of affect alone; indeed, unless 
the complex and deep-seated habits underlying embodied and socio-political 
patterns and tendencies are identified - and affirmatively refigured - 
transformation is likely to be both superficial and fleeting.  Particular 
technological and social aspects of contemporary digital culture may well 
mitigate against cognitive disaffection - the Ǯǯ
images that Sontag discussed.  At the same time, a critical concern remains: what 
new habits are being engendered through our everyday engagement with the 
visual affectivities of social media, and how might such processes relate to the Ǯǯocial change in which many on the political left remain 
invested?  
 
In this vein, it seems significant that, instead of connecting the novelty or 
intensity of digital affect to the promise of progressive social transformation, 
other contributions to Networked Affect associate it with experiences of 
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entrapment and the reproduction of the neoliberal status quo.  For Susanna 
Paasonen, our habitual social media use is primarily driven by a search for 
affective intensity.  However, this promise of intensity is rarely delivered and 
thus Ǯsearch for thrills, shocks and jolts continues despite, or perhaps 
because of, the boredom involved in browsing fǯȋ2015: 
30).  ǡǮa binding 
techniquǯǢ fuels our compulsive attachment to social media platforms like Ǯ	ǡǡǡȏȐǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ȌǤ  Drawing on Ǯǯǡshe contends that that this repetitive 
process of seeking affective satisfaction online Ǯǯǡoduces a 
certain kind of pleasureǣǮthe subject enjoys through repetitionǯ (2015: 90).  Yet, 
crucially, it is this enjoyment - Ǯǡry forwarded image ǯ - that entraps contemporary subjects within the affective logics of 
neoliberalism (90).  Indeed, ǯ view, it is precisely when we think that we 
are pursuing progressive social change through our digital affective labour that 
we are actually providing the fuel that drives communicative capitalism.   
 
While our ongoing search for affective sparks keeps us habitually glued to 
various digital platforms and threads, it does not, these scholars argue, engender 
robust habits of political engagement, solidarity and action.  As Dean contends, 
our affective attachments to digital media do not produce actual political 
communitiesǡǮfeelings of communityǯ (original italics, 91).  
Through our repetitive affective engagement online, she suggests, we are Ǯcaptured in our passivity, or more precisely, by the reversion of our ǲǳǲǳǯ (italics mine, 99).  ǯ double law of 
habit, Dean makes a clear distinction between repeated feeling and repeated 
action Ȃ belying our compulsive desire to seek yet another affective spark, she 
contends, our digital interactions routinely Ǯ ǯȋ90).  
Thus, while those invested in the political promise of empathy argue that, 
through its affective charge, empathy can induce psychic or embodied 
transformation with the potential to spur action in the interest of social justice, 
Dean contends that the affective rhythms of contemporary digital 
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communication in fact perpetually defer action, keeping us trapped within the 
affective feedback loops of global capitalism.  And for Dean, like Sontag, it is 
ultimately action, not feeling, that matters to projects of social justice.  
 
Affective inhabitation: The activity of sensing 
 
Yet, are political feeling and political action as opposed as these scholars 
suggest? Is habitual affect always deadening of radical political force? In order to 
deepen our understanding of the links between visual images, media 
technologies and social change, we need to think more carefully about the 
relations between affect and habit, and the attendant states of passivity and 
activity.  To do so, it is pertinent at this stage to explore the logics of the Ǯdouble ǯin greater detail.   
 ǯǡ so far, would appear to provide 
strong theoretical underpinning for the equation of repeated sensation with 
increasing passivity, the workings of habit and affect are actually more 
complicated than this.  As Clare Carlisle notes, the Anglican bishop Joseph Butler, 
writing before Ravaisson in his 1736 text The Analogy of Religion, had already Ǯ
one hand, and sensationǯȋCarlisle, 2014: 27).  He 
argues, however, that in particular circumstances, feeling or sensing can be Ǯǯ Ǯ
than ǯȋ2014: 82).  From this perspective, feeling and 
action are not as distinct or oppositional as they may first appear; in fact, they 
are intimately intertwined.  RavaissonǯOf Habit ([1888]2008) illustrates this 
point through a comparison between the Ǯǯ and the connoisseur: While 
the drunkard Ǯǯ, the Ǯǯ 
(Carlisle, 2014: 81) Ȃ Ǯǯ
(Ravaisson, [1838]2008: 49).  That is, through his attentiveness, the connoisseur 
transforms the effects of affective repetition so that they intensify, rather than 
diminish, his sensorial experience.  Significantly, this kind of example does not 
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invalidate the double law of habit; instead, it indicates that sensing has been 
made into an activity, Ǯso that the law of active habit has greater effect than the ǯ (Carlisle, 2014: 81).  In complicating presumed link 
between feeling and inactioǡǯǯ
with the continental philosophy of Spinoza and Deleuze ([1968]2011), for whom 
affect is indicative of constant movement, flow and transformation in a universe 
where nothing ever truly repeats. 
 
These philosophical mediations on affect and habituation raise wider critical 
questions about how we currently understand socio-political activity, progress 
and change - what we think counts as transformative Ǯǯ
how, and why, we routinely interpret passivity as that which simply reifies the 
status quo.  If, as scholars of digital culture have argued, affect functions not only 
as a jolt or spark that might move us (at least temporarily), Ǯbinding 
techniqueǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍ that keeps us attached Ǯǯǡ
meme or digital platform, how, I want to ask, might we consider some of the 
more potentially productive implications of such affective attachment? More 
specifically, when might the Ǯǯ of visual images or digital environments 
generate not (or not only) neoliberal entrapment, but rather (or also) more 
affirmative forms of political inhabitation Ǯǯ? And how, in turn, 
might such immersive affective experiences engender forms of attentiveness, 
care and connection that transform Ǯǯ 
political and ethical implications? My primary concern in this final section, then, 
is what happens when we re-read affective entrapment as affective inhabitation?   
 
Such questions are engaged suggestively by Jill Bennet in Empathic Vision: Affect, 
Trauma and Contemporary Art.  Here, Bennett explores the capacity of our Ǯ-ǯ
modes of perception in ways that may be conducive to critical ethics and politics.  
Crucially, however, she stresses, drawing on the work of Deleuze and Massumi, 
that there is an important difference between images that are simply shocking ǮǯǤ BǮan ǯǡ genuinely transformative engagement with visual art requires 
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Ǯǯ
different forms of affective inhabitation (2006: 5).  In other words, while affect 
can provide a jolt that thrusts us involuntarily into critical inquiry, it can also 
work as a binding technique that protracts our relationship with an image even 
after we physically turn away, compelling us to inhabit Ȃ to notice, attend to and 
reflect on - the sensorial intensity our encounter and its critical implications.   
When this happens, I want to suggest, sensing can be Ǯturned into an activityǯ that 
engages the possibility of transformation at the level of habit Ȃ calling our 
attention to, as Tony Bennett puts it, Ǯǡǯ
in patterned perception which may Ǯthe opportunity for new forms of ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ?ȌǤ 
 
Indeed, if perception is continually mediated by Ǯ ǯ
become habitual (Sontag, 2003; Gibbs, 2007), the very fact that such scripts are 
reproduced through the force of habit means that they are open to the possibility 
of modification.  It is when we are made consciously aware of such patterns of 
seeing, through a sense that they have been disrupted, that we become attuned 
to the surfacing Ǯǯ (T. Bennett, 2013, 2015) for material 
transformation: for the re-making of dominant habits of perception, thought and 
conduct.   As Elizabeth Grosz puts it in her discussion of habit and the senses, Ǯsensations are the mark of the emergence of unpredictability, a delay or gap ǥ
provocations to the generation oǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?ȌǤ Conditions of 
viewing, however, are vital to such processes.  As Jill Bennett argues, the 
repeated reincorporation of affect back into dominant scripts (through, for ǡǮǯȌ is a result oǮ
images under conditions that precisely ǯǯǯȋǡ2006: 64).  Under what environmental and 
material circumstances sensing prompted by images might become an activity 
that enables intervention in everyday conduct to re-make existing habits of 
seeing, thinking, feeling and acting, then, remains an important open question.  
Yet what is clear from the above analysis is that meaningful and enduring forms 
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of transformation require the ongoing interaction of ǮǯǮǯ Ȃ a relational dynamic central to processes of affective inhabitation.      
 
Thinking further about how our engagement with visual images might imbricate 
affect and habit in transformative ways, I want to return now to the realm of 
digital media and culture.  Recall that iǯ (2015b) analysis 
of feminist online activism, the political efficacy of visual memes depends on both 
affective amplification and creative participation.  In other words, in political 
practices of meme-making, feeling and action (or affect and habit) are never 
separate, but rather, always materially bound up together.  Ǯ	ǯǡǡ
sensations they engender (i.e. a burst of politically-salient laughter, the powerful 
sense of inhabiting an ad-hoc feminist community).  At the same time, the very 
fact that memes require imaginative forms of re-mixing and re-purposing in 
order to be memes, points to the active forms of digital practice they entail.  
Importantly, as Rentschler and Thrift underscore, such collective and relational 
forms of crafting (which frequently blur the divide between online and offline 
activity) work to constitute vital feminist techné Ȃ the embodied skills, 
techniques and habits of Ǯdoing feminismǯ online (2015a).  As such, meme-
making is, for these authorsǡǮǯȋ
Dean would have it), but also about cultivating an Ǯembodied relationship to 
technology, a learned and socially habituated way of doing things with machines, 
tools, inteǡǡǯȋǡ2015a: 242).  Thus, rather 
that constituting a passive form of digital entrapment, memes offer a powerful Ǯǯǡ Ǯǯ
(2015b: 341) - and, I would add, the very material of bodies.  
 
Crucially, contemplating the interactions of affect and habit through the visual 
intensities of digital culture also enables us to re-approach the meaning and Ǯǯ.  I began this article by noting the investment many 
continue to sustain in the power of visual images to act as turning points for 
processes of collective and structural transformation.  Yet, instead of focusing on 
major turning points, pivotal political events or revolutionary transformation, 
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ǯ calls attention to the 
significance of linked moments of affecting and being affected, of making and re-
making, that resound across time.  From this perspective, Ǯǯ
figured not as a dramatic end-point on the horizon but rather as alive in the 
present Ǯǲǳǲǳ ǥ from one 
event form to another, even when temporally or geographically removedǯ
(2015a: 243).  This is a vision of socio-political transformation, then, that 
eschews teleological narratives of historical progress to approach change as 
imminent and ongoing - as continually pulsating through emergent affective 
relations and networks.  In this ontology of change, the accumulation and 
reverberation of micro interactions, gestures, and habits may be just as (or 
more) significant than Ǯǯ events.  Importantly, however, as Dewey 
([1922]2012) and other philosophers of habit have argued, the course of Ǯǯ deterministically in advance Ȃ  it 
may only be possible to discern in retrospect which collective actions or 
interactions made a difference in a given context; what peaked and fizzled and 
what took shape and endured.  
 
Thus, in considering the relationship between visual images and social 
transformation, we must ask not only how change works at a material level but 
also what counts as change.  In order to better appreciate what might be 
unexpectedly politically significant and transformative across time, Rentschler 
and Thrift shift onto-epistemological regǮǯǮǯǤ 
This is, I want to suggest, significant.  As the philosopher Erin Manning argues, ǮǯǡǡǮǯǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ?ȌǤǮǯǡ
Manning contends, that offer the potential for alternative capacities and forms of 
habituation ǮǯǡǮt that tendency can ǯȋȌ.  In turn, I want to argue, it is through inhabiting our ongoing sensorial 
experience in the present that we can hone our attunement to alternative 
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possibilities for perception and conduct in the making - for the potential for 




Through an analysis of visual images and media technologies, this article has 
argued that theorising affect and habit as imbricated may enable us to better 
appreciate the contemporary dynamics and possibilities of socio-political 
change.  While affective habituation is widely associated with the deadening 
process of compassion fatigue, our continual becoming through images does not, 
I have suggested, inevitably lead to desensitisation or disaffection.  Rather, when 
we are compelled to inhabit our sensorial responses to visual culture, we may 
become better attuned to the workings and potentialities of everyday habits of ǡǡǤǡǯǮbinding ǯcompulsive circuits of communicative 
capitalism (Dean, 2015), it might also alert us to the malleability of our habitual 
ways of being in the world.  As my discussion of digital media, in particular, has 
sought to illustrate, however, our encounters with images do not act as singular 
turning points in the production of radical change.  Rather, in a context in which 
images are always connected to other images (as well as bodies, infrastructures 
and environments) more enduring forms of socio-political transformation may 
emerge Ǯǯ the accumulation, 
reverberation and reshaping of seemingly minor affective responses, interactions, 
gestures and habits.     
 
Returning to the haunting photograph of Alan Kurdi this piece opened with, it is 
perhaps impossible to say with any certainty what material impact it had or may 
continue to have over time.  The fact that it was this image (and not one of the 
thousands of other photographs of darker-ǡǮ-ǯ
refugee children internationally) that elicited such a powerful public response 
may be interpreted as evidence of deeply-rooted habits of racism and 
ethnocentrism being relentlessly reproduced.  Moreover, the watering down or 
retraction of the humanitarian policies towards refugees that the photograph 
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initially prompted might be taken as proof of the inevitability of affective 
desensitisation and the unstoppable force of neoliberal and neocolonial habits of 
governance.  And yet, the complex travels and transformations of the photograph 
- through print, television, social media, art and activism Ȃ generated 
opportunities for affecting and being affected, habituation and re-habituation, 
and reflection and reverberation that exceeded the contours of its initial 
reception in unpredictable ways.  Having seen the mural of Kurdi in Frankfurt, 
for example, some asked why it had been painted in Germany and not Syria - a 
question that prompted wider critical discussions regarding the transnational 
contours and causes of the European refugee crises, as well as the ethical 
obligations it entailed (Bill, 2016).  When the mural was vandalised by suspected 
far-right nationȋǮǯ
across the painting) conversations again erupted across a range of platforms 
regarding the racialised politics of international border controls.  Local citizens 
subsequently initiated a fundraising campaign to enable the artists to restore the 
painting, insisting, as fǡ Ǯǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍ.   
 	ǡǯ photograph was released, the online news site 
Buzzfeed Ǯ ? ?
World Mourning the Drowned Syrian Bǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǣȌǤ  In 
response, some denounced the Ǯǯ of the image and queried the 
ethics of sharing this kind of photograph online.  The Australian journalist Chad 
Parkhill argued, for instance, that such Ǯǯtably sap 
affective Ǯǯ, abstracting from its singular capacity to 
reveal a Ǯhuman being whose short life was ended by a catastrophic chain of ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ Yet, for others, it is possible that the creative re-
purposing of the image is precisely what sustained and heightened its affective 
purchase.  Importantly, both critical and sympathetic responses to the 
photogǯ signalled forms of affective connection Ȃ acts of Ǯstaying withǯ the image and the sensation it engendered.  What might emerge as 
significant about such linked moments across time and space, and the resonance 
of political energy pulsing through them, remains to be known.  What seems 
clear, however, is that the shock of Aǯ image functioned not simply as 
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Ǯǯǡ a Ǯǯ into Ǯmore extended form[s] of 
engagementǯ (Bennett, 2006: 65) Ȃ it is through the such processes of affective 
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